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Singapore as a centre for international commercial litigation:
party autonomy to the fore
Adeline Chong * and Man Yip**
This article considers two recent developments in Singapore private
international law: the establishment of the Singapore International
Commercial Court and the enactment of the Hague Convention on Choice
of Court Agreements 2005 into Singapore law. These two developments are
part of Singapore’s strategy to promote itself as an international dispute
resolution hub and are underscored by giving an enhanced role to party
autonomy. This article examines the impact of these two developments on
the traditional rules of private international law and whether they achieve
the stated aim of positioning Singapore as a major player in the
international litigation arena.
Keywords: conﬂict of laws; private international law; party autonomy;
jurisdiction; extraterritorial jurisdiction; choice of court agreements; foreign
judgments; Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention
A. Introduction
The last few years can fairly be said to be momentous years in terms of the devel-
opment of Singapore’s private international law landscape. This is primarily due to
two developments. First, the Singapore International Commercial Court (the
“SICC”) was established on 5 January 2015. The SICC is a specialist court
which caters to international commercial litigation. Secondly, the Hague Conven-
tion on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (“HCCCA”) entered into force in Sin-
gapore law on 1 October 2016.1
These two developments go hand-in-hand and are part of Singapore’s strategy
to promote the nation as an international dispute resolution hub.2 Looking out-
wardly, Singapore’s strategy coheres with the emerging trend of judicial
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1The implementing legislation is the Choice of Court Agreements Act 2016.
2Singapore has adopted a three-pronged approach in this regard: through the promotion of
litigation (SICC in particular), arbitration (Singapore International Arbitration Centre) and
mediation (Singapore International Mediation Centre).
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specialisation and competition for judicial business.3 Looking deeper within, Singa-
pore’s developments are underscored by party autonomy; in some circumstances the
boundaries of the scope of party autonomy have been stretched beyond orthodoxy.
This article has as its aim the consideration of these two key developments in
Singapore private international law. Their impact on traditional conﬂict of laws
and whether they achieve the aim of positioning Singapore as a major player in
the international litigation arena will be examined. To that end, this article is
divided in three main parts. First, by way of background, we will discuss the cre-
ation of the SICC and its salient features, as well as an evaluation of the SICC’s
appeal to potential users. Secondly, we will compare the pre-SICC jurisdictional
principles applied by the Singapore High Court with the in personam jurisdictional
framework of the SICC. In particular, we will consider the interplay between the
SICC framework with the traditional Spiliada test. Thirdly, the impact of Singa-
pore’s ratiﬁcation of the HCCCA on Singapore’s jurisdictional laws and the enfor-
ceability of Singapore court judgments abroad will be considered.
B. The SICC: survey
The SICC, a litigation model inspired by the English Commercial Court,4 was
launched on 5 January 2015. The feasibility study preceding the creation of the
SICC stated that, as a result of the continued growth of cross-border investment
and trade in Asia, there is a need for “a neutral and well-regarded dispute resol-
ution hub in the region”.5 In terms of framework design, the SICC bears three
key characteristics that enhances Singapore’s capacity to become that “neutral
and well-regarded” dispute resolution centre: hybridisation, internationalisation
and prioritisation of party autonomy. We will explain these three characteristics
in greater detail below.
To gauge the SICC’s appeal to its potential users, we conducted an online
survey6 between 26 January 2016 and27 July 2016 to study the factors that
3France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, China and Kazakhstan have taken steps to set up
their models of international commercial courts. English courts are also undergoing
rebranding and the Financial List, a specialist court, has been created to foster its position
in commercial litigation. See http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/announcements/launch-of-
business-and-property-courts/ accessed on 18 September 2018.
4See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4c33f0c0-e716-11e3-88be-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3xOj
ZCIYM accessed on 18 September 2018.
5Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee (November, 2013)
(“SICC Committee Report), at http://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/
Annex%20A%20-%20SICC%20Committee%20Report.pdf accessed on 18 September 2018.
6We would like to thank the Singapore Corporate Counsel Association for helping us to dis-
seminate the survey to their network of partners worldwide and Mr Wong Taur-Jiun, Ms
Angeline Joyce Lee and Mr Douglas Chi for comments on the draft survey. The survey
results were presented at the In-House Counsel World Summit 2016 in Paris, France on
24 October 2016.
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inﬂuence the decision-making process of corporate in-house counsel in choosing
the kind of dispute resolution mechanism as well as the forum for resolving the
dispute. We received 62 attempted responses to our survey,7 out of which 47
responses were usable. Of the 47 respondents, 40 were based in Singapore,
with the remaining respondents working in Japan, Australia, Hong Kong, Indo-
nesia, Sri Lanka, and Canada. 39 respondents covered more than one jurisdiction
in their work scope. Our respondents worked in diverse ﬁelds such as technol-
ogy,8 banking and ﬁnance,9 and manufacturing.10 Given the geographical demo-
graphic of the respondents, we are aware that the survey results may not
accurately reﬂect, much less be conclusive of, the trends among in-house
counsel worldwide. However, the survey results are indicative of the decision-
making process of corporate in-house counsel working in the Asia Paciﬁc
region, especially Singapore—jurisdictions in which the SICC will likely ﬁrst
gain popularity.
In our survey,11 respondents were asked to indicate which dispute resolution
mechanism they would most frequently include in the contracts which they
drafted and/or negotiated. Regardless of the respondents’ geographical location
or work scope, the overwhelming favourite was arbitration (54%), followed by
litigation (35%).12 Respondents were also asked to rank the top three factors
which inﬂuenced their decision on the method of dispute resolution from a
ﬁxed list: speed, fairness, conﬁdentiality, procedural ﬂexibility, enforceability
of outcome, cost, transparency and accountability in the dispute resolution
process, and prestige and reputation of the adjudicating institution. The top
three considerations in general were enforceability of outcome, cost and
speed. In terms of the breakdown by favoured dispute resolution mechanism,
respondents who favoured arbitration prioritised conﬁdentiality, procedural
ﬂexibility, enforceability of outcome, cost and speed in their decision-making
process. On the other hand, those who favoured litigation chose fairness, trans-
parency and accountability in the dispute resolution process as being key
factors.
7The survey responses were submitted anonymously.
817 respondents.
914 respondents.
1011 respondents.
11We asked a number of questions in the survey but only those relevant to this article will be
addressed in this part.
12Mediation was chosen by 6% while 5% chose a combination clause. The preference for
arbitration over other dispute resolution mechanisms is also reﬂected in the ﬁndings in the
study conducted by Singapore Academy of Law’s International Promotion of Singapore
Law Committee (“SAL Study”). See a summary of the key ﬁndings from the SAL study
(http://www.ciarb.org.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/SAL_Singapore_Law_Survey.pdf
accessed on 18 September 2018). In the SAL Study, enforceability of decisions was found
to be a key priority in deciding the method of dispute resolution.
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To better understand the overwhelming preference for arbitration, it is helpful
to refer to the Queen Mary University of London and White & Case LLP 2018
International Arbitration Survey ﬁndings.13 In summary, 97% of their survey
respondents indicated arbitration as the preferred method of resolving cross-
border disputes, either as a stand-alone (48%) or together with ADR (49%). In par-
ticular, within the in-house counsel subgroup respondents, 92% preferred inter-
national arbitration (as a stand-alone or together with ADR); 8% preferred
cross-border litigation in conjunction with ADR; and no respondent chose
cross-border litigation as a stand-alone. Generally, “enforceability of awards”
was perceived as arbitration’s best attribute, followed by “avoiding speciﬁc
legal systems/national courts”, “ﬂexibility” and “ability of parties to select arbitra-
tors”. Arbitration’s worst attributes are, in descending order, “costs”, “lack of
effective sanctions during the arbitral process”, “lack of power in relation to
third parties” and “lack of speed”. Respondents also “think that arbitration rules
should include provisions dealing with arbitrator conduct in terms of both stan-
dards of independence and impartiality and efﬁciency (or lack thereof)”.
In light of the two sets of survey ﬁndings, how does the SICC compare with
arbitration? To be clear, the SICC was not established with a view of supplant-
ing or competing with arbitration.14 Our evaluation should thus be focused on
its viability as a dispute resolution option given the availability of international
commercial arbitration. By way of an overview, the SICC is a hybrid frame-
work incorporating the advantageous features of both litigation and arbitration.
Under this framework, there is greater scope for the exercise of party autonomy
in respect of procedural rules compared to the traditional litigation process.15
Yet, unlike arbitration, parties’ choices are generally subject to judicial
approval. The parties to SICC proceedings may apply to the court for the dis-
application of the Singapore rules of evidence and for the application of foreign
rules or rules that are not part of a legal system.16 Further, while foreign law is
ordinarily treated as a question of fact which has to be pleaded and proven,17
the parties of a SICC case may request that foreign law be determined on the
basis of submissions instead.18 In connection with this, foreign lawyers may
more readily be granted leave to represent the parties in proceedings before
13http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/research/2018/ accessed on 18 September 2018.
14See S Menon (Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Singapore), “International Courts:
Towards a Transnational System of Dispute Resolution”, Opening Lecture for the DIFC
Courts Lecture Series 2015, 19 January 2015.
15For more details, see M Yip, “Special Reports – Singapore International Commercial
Court: A New Model for Transnational Commercial Litigation” (2015) 32 Chinese
(Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 155.
16Supreme Court of Judicature Act, s18K; Rules of Court, O 110, rr 23–24.
17Greenline-Onyx Envirotech Phils, Inc v Otto Systems Singapore Pte Ltd [2007] 3 SLR(R) 40
(CA), [24]; Paciﬁc Recreation Pte Ltd v SY Technology Inc [2008] 2 SLR(R) 491 (CA), [54].
18Supreme Court of Judicature Act, s 18L; Rules of Court, O110, rr 25–29.
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the SICC,19 especially if the case is an “offshore case”.20 There is also the
possibility that proceedings be made conﬁdential on the application of a
party; again, special consideration will be given in an “offshore case”.21
Another novel feature is that the parties may agree in writing to waive, limit
or vary their right to appeal against the SICC’s judgment.22 Finally, unlike
the arbitral model, parties to SICC proceedings have no say over the appoint-
ment of judges. The power of appointment lies with the Chief Justice of Sin-
gapore.23 Yet, it should be noted that the SICC, whilst a domestic court,
operates on an internationalised framework. Other than experienced Singapore
judges,24 the SICC also boasts a panel of International Judges. At the time of
writing, 15 International Judges – drawn from civilian and common law juris-
dictions – have been appointed.25 As such, whilst parties have no direct say
over the appointment of the judges, the appointment outcome is not completely
unpredictable as the applicable law is a factor taken into account in the appoint-
ment process.26 Overall, the SICC framework enables a greater degree of pro-
cedural ﬂexibility than traditional litigation but it also assures users of greater
transparency and accountability in its dispute resolution process than
arbitration.
In our survey, respondents were also asked what factors inﬂuenced their choice
of forum for litigation. 93% of respondents who recommend litigation for resol-
ving disputes arising out of at least some of the cross-border commercial contracts
they handle ranked enforceability of outcome as the top consideration in their
decision-making process. This is followed by the efﬁciency of the legal system,
its maturity and whether it is an established legal system. Factors such as the
19Singapore International Commercial Court Practice Directions, Practice Direction No
26, http://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/sicc-
practice-directions—effective-from-1-jan-2017.pdf accessed on 18 September 2018.
20An “offshore case” is an action with no substantial connection to Singapore. See Rules of
Court, O 110, r 1(1).
21Rules of Court, O 110, r 30.
22Singapore International Commercial Court Practice Directions, supra note 32, Practice
Direction No 139, incorporating the recommendations of the SICC Committee Report,
supra note 5, [35]. On the SICC appeal framework, see generally J Yeo, “On Appeal
from Singapore International Commercial Court” (2017) 29 Singapore Academy of Law
Journal 574.
23The practice of allowing party-appointed arbitrator has come under trenchant attack: see S
Menon, “Adjudicator, Advocate or Something in Between?: Coming to terms with the role
of the party-appointed arbitrator” (2017) 34 Journal of International Arbitration 347.
24For more details, see: https://www.sicc.gov.sg/Judges.aspx?id=30 accessed on 18 Sep-
tember. For most recent appointments, see: https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/
singapore/four-new-judges-appointed-to-singapore-international-commercial-9828592
accessed on 18 September 2018.
25The International Judges do not enjoy security of tenure and are appointed for a ﬁxed
term.
26Rappo v Accent Delight International Ltd [2017] 2 SLR 265, [122].
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geographic proximity and procedural rules of the litigation forum are not, in
general, prioritised features.
The enactment of the HCCCA into Singapore law, discussed in Part D, will
increase the enforceability of SICC judgments, at least where there is a forum
choice of court agreement. As to efﬁciency, the Singapore Supreme Court has a
target of disposing of 85% of all writ actions within 18 months of ﬁling, a
target which has been exceeded in recent years.27 It would also be fair to say
that the Singapore legal system is one of the more mature and well established
in the region.
In relation to features which were ranked low in the order of priority in our
survey, the relative unimportance of geographic proximity bodes well for
SICC’s aim of attracting “offshore cases”. All in all, while it is early days to tell
if the SICC will be a popular dispute resolution mechanism for the international
business community,28 its procedural rules are suitably attractive for it to be a
viable option. But this is not quite enough, especially if its broader goal is to
compete for judicial business with other litigation hubs. Its jurisdictional rules
must also be user-friendly, particularly for attracting cases that would not other-
wise be heard in Singapore. It is to this aspect of the SICC framework we now
turn. We will show in Part C, by comparing both the traditional rules and the
SICC rules, that party autonomy is and should be the philosophical foundation
of the latter. Forum shopping is now something to be desired.
C. Jurisdiction
1. Pre-SICC rules
The basis of the jurisdiction of the Singapore High Court is found in the Supreme
Court of Judicature Act (“SCJA”).29 Where civil in personam jurisdiction of the
High Court is concerned, the key provisions are sections 16 and 17 of the SCJA.
Section 16, encapsulating the English “common law”30 approach, provides that
27This target has been regularly met or exceeded: CH Foo, E Chua and L Ng, “Civil Case
Management in Singapore: of Models, Measures and Justice” (2014) ASEAN Law Journal
1, 20. Recent statistics on the clearance rate for civil matters can be found at “Shaping The
Future of Justice: Supreme Court Annual Report 2016”, 25 (http://www.supremecourt.gov.
sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/supreme-
court355c3033f22f6eceb9b0ff0000fcc945.pdf accessed on 18 September 2018).
28To date, the SICC has handed down 30 judgments (including six appellate judgments),
with some concerning procedural issues and others on substantive issues of law. In February
2018, a ﬁrst non-transfer case was ﬁled in the SICC. See http://www.sicc.gov.sg/
HearingsJudgments.aspx?id=72 accessed on 18 September 2018.
29Cap 332, Rev Ed 2007.
30A shorthand for a combination of common law and legislation.
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the Singapore High Court has jurisdiction over the defendant if the defendant has
been served with the originating process in Singapore, has submitted to the jurisdic-
tion of the court, or has been servedwith the originating process outside of Singapore
in accordance with the Rules of Court.31 This traditional regime reﬂects the common
law view that service of legal process not only performs the function of notiﬁcation
of proceedings, it also creates jurisdiction. Section 17 further provides that jurisdic-
tion of the High Court includes jurisdiction conferred by other written laws.
Conceptually, under Singapore law, it is crucial to distinguish between territor-
ial personal jurisdiction and extra-territorial personal jurisdiction, as well as
between existence and exercise of jurisdiction. Our discussion shall focus on
the Singapore High Court’s32 extraterritorial jurisdiction, a key point of comparison
with the SICC regime.33 Territorial jurisdiction is established as of right.34 Extra-
territorial jurisdiction, on the other hand, is discretionary.35 Singapore’s approach
towards service out of jurisdiction is generally consistent with the English approach
for cases that fall within Article 6(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation and Article 4(1)
of the Lugano II Convention.36 The requirements for obtaining leave from the
Singapore High Court to serve out of jurisdiction are as follows:37
(a) the plaintiff’s claim must be shown on the standard of “a good arguable
case” that it falls within one of the heads of jurisdiction set out under
Order 11 rule 1 of the Rules of Court;
(b) there must be a serious issue to be tried on the merits of the claim; and
(c) Singapore must be the proper forum for the trial of the claim, determined
according to the principles enunciated in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Can-
sulex Ltd38 (the Spiliada test).
31Cap 322, r 5.
32The SICC is a division of the Singapore High Court. In this article, references to the “Sin-
gapore High Court” or ‘High Court’ should be understood to mean the Singapore High
Court sans the SICC, unless otherwise indicated.
33As the SICC is established to deal with international commercial disputes, it is expected
that many of its cases would involve foreign defendants.
34The Singapore High Court has territorial jurisdiction over the defendant if the defendant
has been served with the originating process in Singapore; the defendant has submitted to
the jurisdiction of the Singapore High Court; or where special provisions have been made in
other written laws.
35See Rules of Court, O 11, r 2.
36Civil Procedure Rules Part 6 Practice Direction B (formerly Civil Procedure Rules Part 6)
codiﬁes English courts’ jurisdiction to serve on a foreign defendant. See also Seaconsar
(Far East) Ltd v Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran (Service Outside Jurisdiction)
[1994] 1 AC 438.
37Bradley Lomas Electrolok Ltd v Colt Ventilation East Asia Pte Ltd [1999] SGCA 89;
[1999] 3 SLR(R) 1156; Zoom Communications Ltd v Broadcast Solutions Pte Ltd [2014]
SGCA 44; [2014] 4 SLR 500, [26].
38[1987] AC 460.
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The burden of showing that the case is a proper one for service out of jurisdic-
tion lies with the plaintiff. This is an acknowledgement that “the exercise of jur-
isdiction by the Singapore courts over a foreign defendant is, in a real sense, an
imposition on him”.39
Relevantly, even where there is a choice of court agreement between the
parties submitting their disputes to the Singapore High Court, leave of court to
serve on a foreign defendant is still required,40 unless there is contractual provision
for a means of service of process in Singapore.41 Where such contractual provision
has been made, it is a case of service within jurisdiction. In other words, the pres-
ence of a Singapore choice of court agreement (whether exclusive or non-exclu-
sive), under the traditional, pre-SICC framework, does not obviate the need to
obtain leave of court for service of legal process abroad. This underlines the tra-
ditional attitude towards service out of jurisdiction being extraordinary and
courts are accordingly to exercise caution.
The exclusivity of the choice of court agreement would, however, affect the
applicable principles to establish that the Singapore High Court is the proper
forum for the trial of the claim. Where the choice of court agreement is exclusive
in nature, the Spiliada test is displaced and instead, the “strong cause” test42 will
be applied. Essentially, the court will uphold the parties’ agreement, unless the
party who is in breach of contract is able to show exceptional circumstances
amounting to strong cause against the enforcement of the agreement. Where the
choice of court agreement is non-exclusive in nature, its effect would depend on
whether Singapore is the chosen forum. Where the chosen forum is a foreign
court, the Spiliada test would be applicable and the choice of court agreement
is one of the factors to be considered under the test.43 Where Singapore is the
chosen forum and Singapore law is the proper law of the contract, to succeed in
a stay application before the Singapore court, the defendant must show “strong
cause” as to justify the breach of the parties’ agreement.44 A strong pro-forum
approach is adopted in relation to non-exclusive choice of court agreements for
the Singapore court.
39Zoom Communications, supra note 37, [72], citing Société Générale de Paris v Dreyfus
Brothers (1885) 29 Ch D 239, 242–43. See also Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v
Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50, 65 (Lord Diplock).
40A jurisdiction agreement is a basis of jurisdiction under Rules of Court, O 11, r 1(d)(iv)
and O 11, r 1(r).
41Rules of Court, O 10, r 3.
42Trisuryo Garuda Nusa Pte Ltd v SKP Pradiksi (North) Sdn Bhd [2017] 2 SLR 814, [83]–
[85]; Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) pte Ltd v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2018] 2
SLR 1271.
43Orchard Capital I Ltd v Ravindra Kumar Jhunjhunwala [2012] SGCA 16; [2012] 2 SLR
519, [25]. The case concerned a non-exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of Hong
Kong courts.
44Shanghai Turbo Enterprises Ltd v Liu Ming [2019] SGCA 11, [88].
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2. The SICC regime
According to section 18D of the SCJA,45 the SICC shall have jurisdiction to hear a
dispute where:
(a) the action is international and commercial in nature;
(b) the action is one that the High Court may hear and try in its original civil
jurisdiction;
(c) the action satisﬁes such other conditions as the Rules of Court may
prescribe.
The Rules of Court, the subsidiary legislation to the SCJA, deﬁnes the terms
“international” and “commercial” widely.46 Remarkably, the parties to the claim
may expressly agree that the subject-matter of the claim is “international”47 or
“commercial”48 in nature.
The Rules of Court further provide that there are two main ways49 in which the
SICC may be seised of jurisdiction. First, where the parties have submitted to the
SICC’s jurisdiction under a written jurisdiction agreement.50 Second, where the
case has been transferred from the High Court to the SICC.51 The SICC also
has jurisdiction over third parties who have been joined to the proceedings that
have been brought before the SICC through either of the aforesaid avenues.52
Our article, given its objectives, shall not discuss the SICC’s jurisdiction over
third parties,53 save to note that the joinder procedure enhances the SICC’s
appeal as a dispute resolution forum. Further, as space constraint does not
permit a comprehensive exposition of the SICC’s jurisdictional rules,54 we
focus on analysing these rules’ impact on Singapore private international law.
45Cap 322, Rev Ed 2007.
46Rules of Court, O 110, rr 2(a) and (b).
47Ibid, r 2(a)(iv). A claim is considered of “international” nature if “the parties to the claim
have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the claim relates to more than one state”. A
case may also be classiﬁed as “international” if parties’ places of business are in different
States or none of the parties’ places of business are in Singapore (see r 2(a)(i)–(iii)).
48Ibid, r 2(b)(iii).
49The SICC has jurisdiction to hear an originating summons issued under O 52 of the Rules
of Court for leave to commit persons for contempt in respect of any SICC judgment or
order.
50Rules of Court, O 110, r 7.
51Ibid, rr 12(3B) and (4).
52Ibid, r 9.
53See discussion in M Yip, “The resolution of disputes before the Singapore International
Commercial Court” (2016) 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 439, 464–65.
54See, for eg, Yeo TM, “Staying Relevant: Exercise of Jurisdiction in the Age of the SICC”,
Eighth Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture 2015 (http://law.smu.edu.sg/sites/
default/ﬁles/law/CEBCLA/YPH-Paper-2015.pdf accessed on 18 September 2018); Yip,
ibid.
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(a) Written jurisdiction agreement: party autonomy and forum-shopping
Where the parties submit by a written jurisdiction agreement to the SICC, Order
110, rule 6(2) of the Rules of Court expressly waives the requirement to obtain
leave of court for service of process on a foreign defendant. Existence of jurisdic-
tion is easily established in claims where parties have submitted to the SICC under
a written jurisdiction agreement. As provided under Order 110, rule 7 of the Rules
of Court, the other requirements are simply that the claim (as it was ﬁrst ﬁled) is of
an international and commercial nature and that the parties are not seeking any
form of prerogative relief. The principles for determining exercise of jurisdiction
are also signiﬁcantly altered under the SICC regime, with the aim of favouring the
SICC resolving the claim. Order 110, rule 8 of the Rules of Court sets out the SICC
principles:
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Court may decline to assume jurisdiction…
if it is not appropriate for the action to be heard in the Court.
(2) The Court must not decline to assume jurisdiction in an action solely on
the ground that the dispute between the parties is connected to a jurisdic-
tion other than Singapore, if there is a written jurisdiction agreement
between the parties.
(3) In exercising its discretion under paragraph (1), the Court shall have
regard to its international and commercial character.
Notably, Order 110, rule 8 does not distinguish between an exclusive juris-
diction agreement and a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement.55 Further, as has
been pointed out, although the governing criterion to determine if the SICC
should decline to assume jurisdiction over a claim is appropriateness, the
55S 18F(1)(a) read with 18F(2) of the SCJA provides that unless there is express provision
to the contrary, the parties to an SICC jurisdiction agreement shall be “considered to have
agreed to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction” of the SICC. It is unclear if the rebuttable
presumption in S 18F(1)(a) applies if the contract is governed by foreign law instead of Sin-
gapore law (see Yeo, supra note 54, 9–10). If S 18F(1)(a) is a forum mandatory rule, it
would apply regardless of the proper law of the contract. Yip, relying on party autonomy
being the cornerstone of the SICC, argues that S 18F(1)(a) ought not be characterised as
a forum mandatory rule, especially in view that the presumption may be rebutted by con-
trary wording (see Yip, supra note 53, 452–54). Cf A Chong, “Singapore: A Mix of Tra-
ditional and New Rules” in M Keyes (ed), Optional Choice of Court Agreements in
Private International Law (Springer, forthcoming). Chong takes the contrary view that S
18F(1)(a) ought to be characterised as a forum mandatory rule on three bases. First, the
general presumption against extraterritoriality of laws is rebutted in the case of the SICC
as it is a court set up to hear disputes with international elements. Second, S 18F(1)(a) is
inspired by Article 3(b) of the HCCCA, the latter of which has been implemented as S 3
(2) of the CCAA. Chong argues that S 3(2) of the Choice of Court Agreements Act
2016 is a forum mandatory rule. Finally, a forum mandatory rule characterisation would
ensure consistency in approach between SICC/non-CCAA jurisdiction agreements and
SICC/CCAA jurisdiction agreements.
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concept in the context of Order 110, rule 8 is in need of more precise deﬁ-
nition.56 However, Order 110, rule 8(2) is instructive that foreign connections
of the claim do not by themselves furnish basis for the SICC to refuse to
assume jurisdiction. After all, the SICC was created to attract more judicial
business to Singapore, and it is envisaged that the increase in volume would
come from disputes that are not substantially connected to Singapore. To put
it simply, the game plan is to make Singapore the forum of choice, to overcome
the fact that it is not the natural forum.
What is beyond doubt, therefore, is that statutory intent and wording support
the conclusion that there are very narrow grounds upon which the SICC may
decline to assume jurisdiction once jurisdiction is established under Order
110, rule 7.57 It is also clear that the traditional Spiliada test is irrelevant. The
SICC Committee Report states that for jurisdiction founded on the basis of an
exclusive jurisdiction agreement, the SICC “would ordinarily dismiss the appli-
cation for a stay unless strong cause can be shown”, without elaborating on what
would amount to “strong cause” under the SICC regime.58 Further, the SICC
Committee Report proposes considering “amending the law” to deal with
cases founded on non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements, although the Report
does not go on to provide further guidance.59 In IM Skaugen SE v Man Diesel
& Turbo SE, Assistant Registrar Zhuang commented,60 in obiter, that the
phrase “not appropriate” under Order 110, rule 8(1) obliges the application of
the Australian “clearly inappropriate forum” test, enunciated in Voth v Manildra
Flour Mills Proprietary Ltd61 (the “Voth test”), instead of the Spiliada test. It has
been forcefully argued that the Voth test does not comport with the statutory
language and intent.62 The better view is that the phrase “not appropriate”
under Order 110, rule 8(1) imports an autonomous concept, not identical with
common law formulations of appropriate forum. However, it is clear that Assist-
ant Registrar Zhang’s comment proceeds from the understanding that the Voth
test is functionally and methodologically different from the Spiliada test. The
Voth test is said to be more restrictive and focused on the appropriateness of
the local forum,63 as opposed to the more comparative approach under the
56Yip, supra note 53, 456–60.
57Yeo, supra note 54.
58See SICC Committee Report, supra note 5, [26]. The Report states that “[f]orum non con-
veniens would not be an issue for consensual cases founded on an exclusive jurisdiction
agreement, as the Singapore court would not allow the contesting party to breach its
agreement”.
59See SICC Committee Report, supra note 5, [27].
60[2016] SGHCR 6, [145].
61[1990] HCA 55; (1990) 171 CLR 538.
62K Chng, “Exploring a New Frontier in Singapore’s Private International Law” (2016) 28
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 649.
63R Garnett, “Stay of Proceedings in Australia: A ‘Clearly Inappropriate’ Test?” (1999) 23
Melbourne University Law Review 30, 34.
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Spiliada test.64 If so, Assistant Registrar Zhuang’s endorsement of the Voth test,
whilst incorrect, does more generally emphasise that Order 110, rule 8 is meant
to be more restrictive than the Spiliada test. In our view, and in line with Assist-
ant Registrar Zhuang’s sentiments, the choice of the word “inappropriate” under
Order 110, rule 8(1) suggests a general disinclination for the SICC to refuse jur-
isdiction65 and this may be justiﬁed on the basis that the parties have chosen the
SICC to hear their dispute. After all, the SICC framework is undergirded by the
principle of party autonomy. Further, the concept of “inappropriate”, on its plain
reading, need not be underlined by a comparative evaluation. The consideration
is not framed as whether it is more appropriate for the High Court or a foreign
court to hear the claim. Such a reading is also consistent with the clariﬁcation
in Order 110, rule 8(2).
More importantly, the SICC rules in relation to jurisdiction based on a written
jurisdiction agreement are clearly more liberal than the traditional rules discussed
above. Leave of court has been dispensed with for cases involving service out of
jurisdiction. This may involve no more than a gentle push beyond the traditional
jurisdictional framework.66 But this small extension reﬂects a clear change in atti-
tude towards the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, bringing to mind Lord
Sumption’s obiter comments in Abela v Baadarani:
The characterisation of the jurisdiction to allow service out is traditional, and was
originally based on the notion that the service of proceedings abroad was an assertion
of foreign power over the Defendant and a corresponding interference with the sover-
eignty of the state in which the process was serviced. This is no longer a realistic
view of the situation. The adoption in English law of the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens and the accession by the United Kingdom to a number of conventions reg-
ulating the international jurisdiction of national courts, means that in the
overwhelming majority of cases where service out is authorised there will have
been either a contractual submission to the jurisdiction of the English court or else
a substantial connection between the dispute and this country. Moreover, there is
now a far greater measure of practical reciprocity than there once was. Litigation
between residents of different states is a routine incident of modern commercial
life… It should no longer be necessary to resort to the kind of muscular presump-
tions against service out which are implicit in adjectives like ‘exorbitant’. The
decision is generally a pragmatic one in the interests of efﬁcient conduct of litigation
in an appropriate forum.67
64This conventional understanding of the Voth test has been vigorously challenged in A
Arzandeh, “Reconsidering the Australian Forum (Non) Conveniens Doctrine” (2016) 65
International Commercial Law Quarterly 475.
65As we will suggest below, the force of this general disinclination for the SICC to refuse
jurisdiction ought to vary depending on whether it is an exclusive jurisdiction agreement or
a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement.
66See discussion above at text to note 41 regarding Rules of Court, O 10, r 3. See also dis-
cussion below, text following note 74.
67[2013] UKSC 44; [2013] 1 WLR 2043, [53]. Lord Sumption’s obiter comments have
attracted ﬁerce criticisms for inconsiderately expanding English courts’ jurisdiction: see
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Briggs relied on Lord Sumption’s dictum to suggest that under the English juris-
dictional regime, the once-statutory jurisdictional gateways – presently contained
in a Practice Direction – are in line to be rendered an oblivion ultimately, leaving
the doctrine of forum conveniens as the sole requirement for service out.68 Briggs’
proposal was categorically rejected by Lord Sumption in the subsequent case of
Four Seasons Holdings Incorporated v Brownlie.69 Lord Sumption clariﬁed that
the crux of his protest in Abelawas directed against “the importation of an artiﬁcial
presumption against service out as being inherently ‘exorbitant’” into the neutral
exercise of construction of the jurisdictional gateways or application of the Spi-
liada test.70 He stressed that he was not proposing an alternative test in Abela.
In view of Lord Sumption’s clariﬁcation in Brownlie, the SICC approach has
clearly pushed beyond the mode of liberality that Lord Sumption considers justi-
ﬁed in Abela. The SICC framework is neither based on reciprocity amongst
nations nor does it apply the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. It
regards party autonomy as a sufﬁcient basis to justify Singapore taking jurisdic-
tion.71 Such an approach still broadly coheres with Lord Sumption’s view that
the modern approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction should be concerned with
the efﬁcient conduct of litigation in an appropriate forum. To generally uphold
parties’ choice of litigation forum ensures efﬁciency in dispute resolution, as
both parties would (or could) have positioned themselves in advance for such a
possibility. The salient features of the SICC, coupled with the parties’ voluntary
submission and the fulﬁlment of requisite formalities for the SICC clause to be
operative,72 greatly reduce the so-called imposition on a foreign defendant to
make out his defence in the forum.
Further, the substantive purpose of service under the SICC regime, in view of
the dispensation of court’s leave to serve out, is arguably to give notiﬁcation of the
institution of proceedings including the essential elements of the claims. This is
notwithstanding that the jurisdiction of the SICC (as with the High Court) is
A Dickinson, “Service abroad – an inconvenient obstacle?” (2014) 130 Law Quarterly
Review 197. Cf Lord Sumption’s clariﬁcation in Four Seasons Holdings Incorporated v
Brownlie [2017] UKSC 80; [2018] 1 WLR 192, [31].
68A Briggs, “Service out in a shrinking world” (2013) Lloyd’s Maritime Commercial Law
Quarterly 415, 417–18.
69[2017] UKSC 80; [2018] 1WLR 192, [31], noted I Bergson and J Folkard, “Service in the
Supreme Court” (2018) 134 Law Quarterly Review 344.
70Ibid.
71The SICC rules are, however, similar in some respects to the jurisdictional rules under the
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005, even for cases which do not fall
under the scope of the HCCCA (see discussion in Part D).
72Unlike the common law approach on validity, an operative SICC clause under the SICC
regime is one that is “written”, which is deﬁned in Rules of Court, O 110, r 1(2)(e) to mean
that the contents are recorded in a form that is “accessible so as to be useable for subsequent
reference”.
Journal of Private International Law 109
conferred and deﬁned by section 16 of the SCJA which, on present drafting,
clearly states that service creates personal jurisdiction.73
There is nevertheless no real inconsistency between the SICC regime and
section 16 of the SCJA. First, the SICC’s rules cohere with the Singapore
court’s views, expressed even with respect to previous iterations of section 16
of the SCJA which did not expressly refer to submission, that submission to the
court’s jurisdiction by the defendant confers jurisdiction to the court.74 Secondly,
Order 10, rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which covers non-SICC claims, already
allows for service as of right where a mode of service within Singapore pursuant
to the choice of court agreement for Singapore has been stipulated. That leave of
court is required in relation to a foreign defendant when a mode of service outside
Singapore has been agreed on or the agreement is silent as to how service is to be
effected is rather anomalous. In all these cases, the parties have chosen Singapore
to be the forum but merely differ as to how notice is to be effected. Order 110 rule
6(2) thus goes some way towards rectifying this state of affairs. Thirdly, a strong
parallel may be made with the common law and Brussels Ia Regulation / Lugano
Convention (“Brussels Regulations”) regimes applied in the English courts. As
Briggs explains, with reference to the English system:
There are, therefore, two kinds of service: that which creates and deﬁnes jurisdiction,
and that which notiﬁes the pre-existence of jurisdiction. Though each serves an
important function, each operates within the conﬁnes of a coherent, self-contained
system, and takes its colour from its surroundings… The nature of European juris-
diction is statutory, in the sense that the legislator lays down a number of rules which
tell a judge whether he or she has judicial jurisdiction. These rules are neither deﬁned
by reference to service of process, which in this context is reduced to a matter of pure
procedural law only, nor framed as including a discretion.75
There remains the further question of whether dispensing with the Spiliada test or
“strong cause” test, a sufﬁcient safeguard in Lord Sumption’s view for the court’s
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, is appropriate. The pertinent consideration
73The SICC regime provides cause for reﬂection as to why the court’s leave for service
abroad should not similarly be abrogated in respect of cases commenced in the High
Court involving forum jurisdiction clauses. This issue harks back to the traditional notion
of exercise of “exorbitant” jurisdiction. Notably, the Singapore courts had observed, pre-
SICC, that service out of Singapore performs the function of notiﬁcation of proceedings,
as opposed to an act of interfering with the foreign state’s sovereignty. See, for eg,
Fortune Hong Kong Trading Ltd v Cosco Feoso (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2000] SGCA 24,
[2000] 1 SLR(R) 962, [30]; ITC Global Holdings Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v ITC Ltd
[2011] SGHC 150, [41].
74Indo Commercial Society (Pte) Ltd v Ebrahim, unreported, 31 October 1986. Cf Indo
Commercial Society (Pte) Ltd v Ebrahim [1992] SGHC 230; [1992] 2 SLR(R) 667,
[44]–[51].
75A Briggs, “The hidden depths of the law of jurisdiction” (2016) Lloyd’s Maritime and
Commercial Law Quarterly 236, 238–39.
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is whether these common law principles are the only proper approach to determine
“proper forum”. Here, the parallel with the English system is weaker. Unlike the
Regulations regime which is applicable to all member States of the European
Union and thereby fostering a foundation of mutual trust and cooperation, there
is no reciprocal basis for the operation of the SICC regime.76 Where an exclusive
jurisdiction agreement is concerned, the SICC regime may nevertheless be justi-
ﬁed on the basis that the strong contract enforcement stance is equally evident
in the common law “strong cause” test. The same, however, cannot be said in
respect of the SICC’s treatment of non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements. Order
110, rule 8 of the Rules of Court does not apparently distinguish between an exclu-
sive jurisdiction agreement and a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. The point
of a (simple) non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement is that parties may sue in differ-
ent fora, even though it is agreed that the contractually-chosen forum is an appro-
priate forum. Notably, the presumption of exclusivity under section 18F of the
SCJA does not apply where the parties have explicitly intended for the jurisdiction
agreement to be non-exclusive.
Do the SICC jurisdictional rules relating to non-exclusive jurisdiction agree-
ments pay sufﬁcient respect to parties’ choice and international comity? In
respect of parties’ choice, an easy response would be that parties who choose,
even non-exclusively, to submit to the SICC would understand the full legal impli-
cations of their choice, including that the SICC regime, on issues of existence and
exercise of jurisdiction, does not generally distinguish between an exclusive jur-
isdiction agreement and a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. As highlighted
above, the SICC Committee Report has proposed “amending the law” for cases
involving non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements. An undifferentiated approach
is not implausible. However, it is overly simplistic and forum-biased. In practice,
non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses vary in drafting and thus the legal effect. The
only commonality between different kinds of non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses
is that they do not have the element of derogation that is entailed in an exclusive
jurisdiction agreement.77 Accordingly, respect for party autonomy, which the
SICC regime so clearly embraces, would demand an interpretation of “inappropri-
ate” in Order 110, rule 8 of the Rules of Court to encompass a calibrated approach,
bearing different thresholds depending on the speciﬁc content of each clause and
the context of each case.78 Setting aside the unique circumstances of each case, it
is suggested that the disinclination to refuse jurisdiction should apply, with dimin-
ishing force, to: an exclusive jurisdiction agreement, a deemed exclusive jurisdic-
tion agreement, and a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. In the last category,
76Except in the context where the HCCCA applies, on which see Part D.
77See further Yeo TM, “The Contractual Basis of the Enforcement of Exclusive and Non-
Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements” (2005) 17 Singapore Academy of Law Journal
306, 337–52; A Briggs, “The subtle variety of jurisdiction agreements” (2012) Lloyd’s Mar-
itime and Commercial Law Quarterly 364, 375–76.
78See Yip, supra note 53, 457.
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the strength of this starting point would vary according to the speciﬁc wording of
the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement.
As for concerns of international comity, two arguments may be made. First, the
traditional common law forum non conveniens principles are regarded in Singa-
pore as being crafted based on the common law’s view of jurisdiction allocation
and what amounts to sufﬁcient respect for international comity.79 Most civilian
countries do not share the same views. Even within the common law world, the
Australian approach – which applies the “clearly inappropriate forum” test –
differs in some degree from the English common law approach which has been
followed by Singapore law.
Secondly, the Spiliada test was developed in an age of skepticism of forum-
shopping, marked by a general unwillingness to overtly compare between legal
systems. We are now in a time of “increasing globalization of legal disputes”.80
We must recognise that not all forms of forum-shopping are bad.81 To sue in a con-
tractually agreed forum, even if non-exclusively chosen, cannot be reproachable
forum shopping.82 The legal expertise, reputation and procedural features of a
forum are, in reality, equally important considerations for litigants83 as factors
of convenience84 and cost. Moreover, in an age where major legal jurisdictions
are marketing their judicial expertise and legal systems, it would appear slightly
hypocritical to say that the modern understanding of “proper forum” cannot
take into account merits of the forum court. These arguments operate with the
greatest force where parties have speciﬁcally chosen the SICC. It may also be rel-
evant to note that the SICC rules, which adopt a moderately forum-biased view of
“proper forum”, avoids an outright comparison of the merits of the competing
legal systems.
(b) Transfer from the High Court to the SICC
The second main avenue through which cases come before the SICC is by way of
transfer of proceedings from the High Court pursuant to Order 110, rules 12(3B)
and (4) of the Rules of Court.85 According to Order 110, rule 12(4) of the Rules of
Court, a dispute may be transferred from the High Court to the SICC if:
79The “Rainbow Joy” [2005] SGCA 36; [2005] 3 SLR(R) 719, [18].
80This phrase is taken from D Foxton, “Foreign Law in Domestic Court” (2017) Singapore
Academy of Law Journal 194, 196.
81See AG Slater, “Forum non conveniens: a view from the shop ﬂoor” (1988) 104 Law
Quarterly Review 554, 560–62.
82Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that international comity plays a reduced role where
parties have made a choice of forum.
83Slater, supra note 81, 561. See also discussion of our survey results under Part B.2.
84Slater (ibid) has pointed out that “[c]onvenience embraces a wide range of factors such as
the availability of legal and technical expertise, communications and other services”.
However, the Spiliada version of “convenience” is far narrower so as to avoid the politically
sensitive exercise of comparing of legal systems.
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(i) It concerns international and commercial claims;
(ii) The parties are not seeking any form of prerogative relief;
(iii) It is more appropriate for the case to be heard in the SICC; and
(iv) Either all parties consent to the transfer or the High court orders the trans-
fer on its own motion after hearing the parties.
If the dispute falls within the HCCCA regime, the transfer jurisdiction is set
out under Order 110, rule 12(3B) which provides for the same requirements as
rule 12(4), save that no transfer can be made unless all parties consent to the trans-
fer, whether the transfer is initiated by a party’s application or on the High Court’s
own motion. We will analyse this difference in relation to parties’ consent in Part
D.
The transfer jurisdiction is generally concerned with the internal allocation of
jurisdiction between the High Court and the SICC,86 which falls outside the scope
of this article that is focused on the conﬂict of laws issues. The exercise of transfer
jurisdiction may however raise a conﬂict of laws issue in one situation: where the
question of transfer of proceedings commenced as of right is raised at the jurisdic-
tional stage before the High Court has determined if it would exercise jurisdiction
and the defendant resists having the claim heard in Singapore, whether in the High
Court or the SICC.87 The issue of transfer may be raised on the High Court’s own
motion or pursuant to one party’s application.88 In such circumstances, the conﬂict
of laws issue is whether the possibility of a transfer of the proceedings to the SICC
is a relevant factor in deciding if Singapore is a distinctly more appropriate forum
(the Spiliada test) than the forum to which the defendant is amenable which the
defendant asserts is more appropriate.89 Notably, this issue arises in the context
of the SICC’s non-consensual jurisdiction. The Singapore Court of Appeal con-
sidered this question in the recent case of Rappo v Accent Delight International
Ltd (“Accent Delight”).90
Accent Delight concerned an application to stay proceedings in Singapore. The
defendants argued that Switzerland and/or Monaco were more appropriate fora to
adjudicate the claims than Singapore. In particular, the plaintiffs’ main claims
against the defendants were founded in equity, and these equitable claims
85In the SICC’s early years, it is expected that this will be the primary way through which
disputes will be brought before the SICC.
86See generally Yip, supra note 53, 461–64.
87Where all parties to the dispute consent to the transfer of proceedings to the SICC, the
transfer will be made, unless the claim is not substantively international or commercial
in nature or if some form of prerogative relief is being sought by one of the parties.
88The plaintiff may apply for the transfer of proceedings to the SICC for strategic reasons,
as a dilatory tactic or to increase the prospects of persuading the Singapore court to hear the
case.
89Siemens AG v Holdrich Investment Ltd [2010] SGCA 23; [2010] 3 SLR 1007, JIO Min-
erals FZC v Mineral Enterprises Ltd [2010] SGCA 41; [2011] 1 SLR 391.
90[2017] SGCA 27; [2017] 2 SLR 265.
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would not be recognised by Swiss or Monegasque courts, though they might be
recharacterised as causes of actions in tort, contract or unjust enrichment. The
High Court requested the parties to submit on the suitability of transfer of proceed-
ings to the SICC.91 It disagreed with the defendants, who objected to the transfer,
that the question of transfer should only be dealt with after the stay application had
been dismissed.
In the Court of Appeal, Menon CJ (delivering the judgment) held that “[t]he
presence of the SICC and its capabilities are potentially relevant to the [Spiliada]
analysis”.92 He illustrated this with the example of the possibility of determining a
question of foreign law based on submissions instead of proof in SICC proceed-
ings.93 This feature of the SICC would reduce costs. Further, the governing law
being foreign law “should carry less weight in the forum non conveniens analysis
if the Singapore courts, through their International Judges in the SICC, are familiar
with and adept at applying that foreign law”.94 Menon CJ, however, stressed that
the capabilities of the SICC and the possibility of transfer are one factor, albeit an
important one, in the forum non conveniens analysis.95 To rely on the possibility of
transfer to the SICC, the plaintiff must articulate the relevant quality of the SICC
and prove that the dispute “is of a nature that lends itself to the SICC’s capabili-
ties”.96 It would be unnecessary for the court to make a conclusive determination
on the question of transfer at the jurisdictional stage; it would sufﬁce for a prima
facie determination to be made.97
This represents a broadening of the range of factors that can be considered
under the Spiliada framework. Although Menon CJ clariﬁed that the presence
of the SICC and the possibility of transfer of proceedings (the “SICC factor”)
would not lead to every case being retained in Singapore,98 the possibility of
such a submission would add a string to the plaintiff’s bow to defeat the defen-
dant’s stay application. This Accent Delight approach was extended in a later
High Court decision, IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo Se (“IM Skaugen
(HC)”).99 In that case, the tort claim (misrepresentation) was governed by
German law. The competing jurisdictions were Singapore, Germany and
Norway. The defendants, in favour of having the claim heard in Germany,
argued that a German court would be best placed to apply German law. They
91Accent Delight International Ltd v Bouvier, Yves Charles Edgar [2016] SGHC 40; [2016]
2 SLR 841, [111].
92Accent Delight, supra note 90, [116]. The Court of Appeal’s decision afﬁrmed an earlier
decision by Assistant Registrar Zhuang in IM Skaugen, supra note 60.
93Accent Delight, supra note 90, [122]. See further Sinco Techonologies Pte Ltd v Singa-
pore Chi Cheng Pte Ltd [2017] SGHC 234, [64-67].
94Accent Delight, supra note 90, [122].
95Ibid, [123].
96Ibid, [124].
97Ibid.
98Ibid, [123–24].
99[2018] SGHC 123.
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further argued that this advantage could not be neutralised by transfer of proceed-
ings to the SICC, as there was no German International Judge on the SICC panel.
The High Court disagreed. It said that the SICC procedural rules allow a question
of foreign law to be determined by submissions as opposed to proof, thus reducing
time and expense in pleading issues of foreign law.100 Further, the Court said that
there were SICC International Judges from civil law jurisdictions equipped “with
the necessary skills and experience to deal with German law here”.101 The Court
highlighted the Japanese International Judge as one such candidate, pointing out
that the Japanese Civil Code had been historically inﬂuenced by the German
Civil Code.102 Remarkably, the Court said that one factor pointed in favour of
the SICC hearing the claim – the case concerned factual and legal connections
that were distributed across various “diverse and geographically divided” jurisdic-
tions.103 This made it “the archetypal dispute which might be better dealt with by
an international panel of judges, as is available under the SICC, than by the judges
of any one jurisdiction”.104 This case is going on appeal before the Singapore
Court of Appeal.
Three points regarding the more nuanced Spiliada test merit highlighting. The
ﬁrst point concerns the weight of the SICC factor. Courts should bear in mind that
the perceived advantages of having the case heard in the SICC, if transfer of pro-
ceedings is made, may ultimately not materialise. A number of the capabilities of
the SICC are subject to the SICC’s approval. The most appropriate International
Judge105 may be unavailable or precluded by reason of a conﬂict of interests.
The proper weight ascribed to the SICC factor should account for these
uncertainties.
Secondly, the more nuanced Spiliada test could hasten the emergence of a
trend of directly comparing the merits of the competing legal systems in the age
of international commercial courts.106 The traditional Spiliada evaluation depre-
cates invidious comparison of procedural advantages available in the competing
fora, unless the court is satisﬁed by reason of their unavailability that substantial
100Ibid, [214].
101Ibid.
102Ibid. Cf Sinco Technologies Pte Ltd v Singapore Chi Cheng Pte Ltd [2017] SGHC 234,
[66]. The claim was found to be governed by Chinese law. The Singapore High Court did
not think a transfer to SICC was appropriate because the case was not “international”; there
is no International Judge who is familiar with or well versed in Chinese law; and documents
were largely in Chinese.
103IM Skaugen (HC), supra note 99, [216].
104Ibid.
105The International Judge factor is not crucially relevant in a case where the dispute is not
centred on issues of law, but this would mean that, in the absence of other factors, there is no
particular advantage of having the claim heard elsewhere as well.
106The comparative exercise is the precise reason the Australian courts have turned away
from the Spiliada test: see J Epstein, “Australia” in JJ Fawcett (ed), Declining Jurisdiction
in Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 1995), 87.
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justice would not be done in the available appropriate forum.107 If, however, the
modern objective of the ad hoc jurisdiction allocation exercise is – consistent with
Lord Sumption’s obiter sentiments in Abela – centrally concerned with the courts’
ability to hear a claim in an efﬁcient and fair manner, the level of deference to
foreign legal systems is not an inﬂexible standard. Relevantly, English judges
are increasingly more openly critiquing foreign systems in cases where there is
a real risk, supported by cogent evidence, that the plaintiff may not be able to
obtain justice abroad.108 Of course, a preference for the SICC can still be
couched in the familiar language of convenience and costs, a core aspect of
forum appropriateness under the Spiliada test, but that is really formal reasoning.
On the basis that a direct comparison of the competing fora is acceptable, could
one argue that the foreign court is better able to decide a dispute governed by
foreign law than an International Judge of the SICC, trained in that foreign law,
but who may have retired from judicial service? This relates to the reasonable
expectations that one may have regarding the proof of foreign law and a forum
court applying foreign law. According to Fentiman, one is not expecting that
the process will generate the correct result but one does expect that the process
is “authentic, capturing the assumptions, reasoning and idiom of the foreign
forum”.109 In a majority of the cases at least,110 the appointment of an Inter-
national Judge trained in the foreign law would better enable the approximation
of the process of having the dispute heard in the relevant foreign court. On this
point, the IM Skaugen (HC) decision might require fuller consideration. Although
the Japanese Civil Code is heavily inﬂuenced by the German Civil Code in many
respects, there are nonetheless differences between the two legal systems, in par-
ticular, Japanese tort law is closer to the French Code.111 As such, greater attention
would need to be paid to the precise similarities between Japanese law and §826 of
the German Civil Code – the agreed applicable provision under German law –
before arriving at any ﬁrm conclusion that the appointment of a Japanese judge
107Spiliada, supra note 38, 482.
108See Deripaska v Cherney [2009] EWCA Civ 849, [2009] 2 CLC 408, [24–45], [56–67];
AK Investment CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2011] UKPC 11, [2011] 4 All ER 1027 [88–
102], [139–51].
109See R Fentiman, Foreign Law in English Courts: Pleading, Proof and Choice of Law
(Clarendon Press, 1998), 20.
110More uncommonly, however, a retired foreign judge’s views may no longer represent the
prevailing views of the current foreign forum. Recent developments on equitable compen-
sation for breach of trust are illustrative. Compare Lord Millett’s views in the Hong Kong
Court of Final Appeal decision in Libertarian Investments Ltd v Hall [2014] 1 HKC 368
with the UK Supreme Court’s decision in AIB Group (UK) Plc Ltd v Redler [2014]
UKSC 58, [2014] 3 WLR 1367.
111Hiroshi Oda, Japanese Law, 3rd edn (OUP, 2009), 181. The general section under the
Japanese Civil Code which deals with tort liability is Article 709, which is based on the
French Civil Code 1382. We would like to thank Dr Wu Ying Chieh for clarifying the com-
parative materials.
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to hear the case would neutralise the advantages of having the case heard in the
German court.
Finally, the more nuanced Spiliada test may have unlocked the door112 to con-
sidering more generally the reputation and acknowledged expertise of the special-
ist courts. Menon CJ certainly did not go that far in Accent Delight. But the High
Court’s comments in IM Skaugen (HC) that the SICC is more appropriate than an
ordinary domestic court to try a case with diverse international connections come
very close to that. Such a development may draw support from the “Cambridge-
shire” factor, a signiﬁcant consideration in the traditional Spiliada test. The “Cam-
bridgeshire” factor relates to the knowledge and experience built up on both sides
and by the presiding judge in dealing with the same or similar issues of great com-
plexity arising in another set of proceedings. If we extend the logic underlining the
“Cambridgeshire” factor, it is strongly arguable that the niche expertise of a
specialist court in dealing with a certain kind of complex litigation may be relevant
in the Spiliada analysis.113 The more important question is what niche expertise
may count as a factor. Returning to IM Skaugen (HC), the proposition that the
SICC may appoint International Judges to hear cases with diverse international
connections therefore makes it the more appropriate forum is not particularly per-
suasive. Whilst we agree that a more international coram composition will ensure a
better understanding of the international elements of the claim, not all international
connections are relevant to the same degree to the resolution of the dispute. In fact,
the high threshold which is required to be satisﬁed before the Cambridgeshire
factor can be successfully raised was emphasised by the Court itself.114 The
merits of this point will need to be revisited on appeal.
The more nuanced Spiliada test appears to be a response to the SICC Commit-
tee Report’s proposal to consider whether “the traditional Spiliada test… remains
modern and relevant to the SICC” in the context of the SICC’s non-consensual jur-
isdiction.115 Whilst there are good reasons for modernising the traditional Spiliada
test in light of the establishment of the SICC, we caution against going too far. It
would give the unintended impression that the creation of the SICC would now
make it unduly difﬁcult for parties to argue that a foreign forum is clearly more
appropriate in resolving the dispute.116 If the ethos of the SICC framework is to
112Cf Amin Rasheed, supra note 39, 67–68 where Lord Diplock said that the popularity of
the Commercial Court in London with foreign litigants and the “unrivalled expertise” of its
judges in the resolution of commercial disputes did not justify treating it as any more than a
national court. His Lordship stressed that cases where parties had chosen the English court
by a jurisdiction clause must be distinguished from cases where the parties had not, as the
latter cases involved an exercise of “exorbitant jurisdiction” over unwilling defendants.
113The same argument cannot be made in respect of specialist courts with general inter-
national commercial litigation experience and expertise.
114IM Skaugen (HC), supra note 99, [240–47].
115SICC Committee Report, supra note 5, [27].
116In fact, the Singapore proceedings were stayed in Rappo v Accent Delight International
Ltd [2017] SGCA 27; [2017] 2 SLR 265.
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uphold party autonomy, the application of the Spiliada test in cases of non-consen-
sual jurisdiction must equally respect the parties’ decision (where this is provable)
not to choose Singapore courts as the dispute resolution forum.
One further and related point merits mention, before we turn to consider the
implementation of the HCCCA in Singapore. Although this article is not generally
concerned with the rules on internal allocation of jurisdiction between the SICC
and the High Court, we propose that the more nuanced Spiliada test, on our analy-
sis, could pave the way for a sensible interpretation of the requirement of “appro-
priateness” for transfer of proceedings under either Order 110, rule 12(3B) or rule
12(4). It has been pointed out elsewhere that the concept of “appropriateness”
under the rules is unclear.117 In our view, the international elements of the case
and their relevance to the resolution of the dispute, the SICC’s capabilities in cater-
ing for the international elements of the case and parties’ consent to a transfer of
proceedings118 ought to be relevant factors in deciding whether it is more appro-
priate for the case to be heard in the SICC as compared with the High Court. The
exercise is necessarily comparative. Where the question of transfer is raised at the
jurisdictional stage before the High Court has determined its international jurisdic-
tion and the defendant is asking for a stay of Singapore proceedings (which is the
scenario examined above), most of these factors (save for parties’ consent) would
have been considered in the Spiliada test. The outcome under the Spiliada analysis
would generally have a strong bearing on the question of appropriateness for the
purpose of ordering transfer of proceedings. Where such a conﬂict of laws issue
does not arise,119 the aforementioned factors can be straightforwardly considered
in the inquiry on appropriateness under Order 110 rule 12(3B) or rule 12(4).
The concept of “appropriateness” for the purposes of the internal allocation of
jurisdiction between the SICC and the High Court is clearly a different creature
from the concept of “inappropriateness”which is used when the SICC is determin-
ing whether to decline jurisdiction. The former, as discussed above, involves deter-
mining whether the features and capabilities of the SICC or those of the High
Court best suit the case at hand. The latter, on the other hand, arguably does not
involve a comparative exercise at all.120 Even if it were the case that an element
of comparison is required under Order 110 rule 8(1), the comparison would be
between two sovereign courts and the angle taken to that comparative exercise
117Yip, supra note 53, 467.
118This factor is relevant to the discretionary exercise under Order 110 rule 12(4), as the
High Court may order transfer of proceedings on its own motion, without having obtained
all parties’ consent. Given our argument that the SICC framework is underlined by party
autonomy, we argue that if a majority of the parties consent to the transfer, this would
make it a more appropriate case for transfer, as compared with a case where only a minority
of the parties consent to the transfer.
119For example, the defendant may wish for the claims to be heard in Singapore, but by the
High Court instead of the SICC.
120See discussion above at text following note 64.
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would be different from that taken in relation to Order 110 rule 12(3B) or rule 12
(4). In particular, as is made clear in Order 110 rule 8(2), international connecting
factors alone would not justify the SICC declining to assume jurisdiction, pre-
cisely because the SICC has the capacity to deal with disputes with international
elements. International connecting factors coupled with evidence to show that the
claim is clearly not commercial in nature might constitute a possible ground on
which the SICCmay decline to assume jurisdiction. By contrast, international con-
necting factors (to the extent that they are relevant to resolving the issues in dispute
in the case) could render the case more appropriate to be heard in the SICC than in
the High Court.
D. Choice of Court Agreements Act 2016
Having considered the SICC’s features and jurisdictional rules, we now move on
to examine the other signiﬁcant, and related, private international law develop-
ment: Singapore’s ratiﬁcation of the HCCCA. To date, the HCCCA has also
entered into force in Mexico, Montenegro and the European Union Member
States, including belatedly, Denmark. China, the US, and Ukraine have signed,
but not ratiﬁed the Convention.121
According respect to party autonomy in relation to a choice of court agreement
of course forms the thrust of the HCCCA. The HCCCA operates on three core
principles.122 First, the chosen court must hear the case. Secondly, the non-
chosen court must refuse to hear the case. Thirdly, a judgment from a chosen
court must be recognised and enforced in other Contracting States.
When assessing whether Singapore ought to sign up to the HCCCA, the Law
Reform Committee had recommended a wait and see attitude in 2013, on grounds
that adopting the Convention did not bring immediate signiﬁcant practical beneﬁts
to Singapore.123 Once the HCCCA came into force and the SICC was set up,
signing up to the Convention was a natural move to take.124 As the results of
the Queen Mary survey and our survey indicate, enforceability of outcome is
121The status table is available at www.hcch.net/en/instruments/specialised-sections/choice-
of-court accessed on 18 September 2018. Although Canada has not ratiﬁed the HCCCA,
Ontario has recently enacted the International Choice of Court Agreements Convention
Act 2017, to give effect to the the HCCCA in anticipation of Canada’s ratiﬁcation.
122Subject to certain exceptions.
123TM Yeo, “Report of the Law Reform Committee on the Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements 2005 (March 2013)”, http://www.sal.org.sg/Portals/0/PDF%20Files/
Law%20Reform/Report%20of%20the%20Law%20Reform%20Committee%20on%20the
%20Hague%20Convention%20on%20Choice%20of%20Court%20Agreements%202005.
pdf accessed on 18 September 2018.
124See The Honourable Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, “Response by Chief Justice Sun-
daresh Menon” Opening of the Legal Year 2016 (11 January 2016), [18], http://www.
supremecourt.gov.sg/Data/Editor/Documents/Response%20by%20CJ%20-%20Opening%
20of%20the%20Legal%20Year%202016%20on%2011%20January%202016%20
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one of the top considerations for parties when choosing the mode of and
forum for dispute resolution. By enacting the HCCCA, the enforceability of Sin-
gapore judgments abroad, at least where Singapore is the chosen forum, is
enhanced.
The implementing legislation is the Choice of Court Agreements Act 2016
(“CCAA”). It can be taken that the Hartley and Dogauchi Report125 will be
highly persuasive in the Singapore court in relation to the interpretation of the
Convention; in the one case to date to be decided under the CCAA, the court
referred extensively to the Report.126 The focus in this section will be on how
the CCAA ﬁts in with the existing jurisdictional framework and whether wider
enforceability of SICC judgments will be ensured.
1. The relationship between the CCAA and the SICC
While the motivation for the Singapore government to ratify the HCCCAwas the
establishment of the SICC, not all SICC cases will fall within the scope of the
CCAA.
The CCAA applies in international cases to exclusive choice of court agree-
ments in favour of the “courts, or one or more speciﬁc courts, of one Contracting
State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other court”127 in civil or commer-
cial matters. While Contracting States have the option of extending the scope of
the HCCCA to non-exclusive choice of court agreements,128 Singapore did not
do so. The SICC, however, can assume jurisdiction on the basis of both exclusive
and non-exclusive choice of court agreements. Even if the SICC assumes jurisdic-
tion on the basis of an exclusive choice of court agreement, it is not a given that the
case will be covered by the CCAA. Asymmetrical choice of court agreements will
likely be considered as exclusive for the purposes of the SICC regime,129 but is not
so under the CCAA.130 Further, while both the SICC and the CCAA cover
(Checked%20against%20Delivery%20110116).pdf accessed on 18 September 2018. Sin-
gapore signed the HCCCA on 25 March 2015.
125T Hartley and M Dogauchi, Explanatory Report: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice
of Court Agreements (https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=
3959 accessed on 18 September 2018) (“Hartley and Dogauchi Report”).
126Ermgassen v Sixcap Financials [2018] SGHCR 8. See also Shi Wen Yue v Shi Minjiu
[2016] SGHCR 8, [16] (overruled on unrelated grounds: [2016] 4 SLR 911).
127CCAA, s 3(1)(b).
128Art 22.
129This is certainly the case at common law: Evans Marshall & Co v Bertola SA [1973] 1
WLR 349, 361.
130This not beyond doubt after Commerzbank AG v Liquimar Tankers Management Inc
[2017] 1 WLR 3497. However, the Hartley and Dogauchi Report, supra note 125, [32],
[105]–[106] and [249], clearly states that assymetrical choice of court agreements are not
exclusive for the purposes of the HCCCA. It is very likely that the Singapore courts
would follow the Hartley and Dogauchi Report’s position on this point. See also TM
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commercial claims, the CCAA,131 but not the SICC,132 also covers civil but non-
commercial claims. In addition, one of the gateways to both the CCAA and the
SICC is that the case or claim must be international, but the two regimes adopt
different deﬁnitions of “international”. For jurisdictional purposes, the CCAA
views a case as being international unless the facts relevant to the dispute and
the connections and relationship of the parties are connected only with one Con-
tracting State apart from a choice of a court of another Contracting State.133 This is
a very wide deﬁnition of “international” but it may be said that the SICC adopts an
even more generous approach: under the SICC’s rules, the parties may expressly
agree that the subject-matter of the claim relates to more than one State, which
thereby renders the claim “international” in nature.134 Cases which are essentially
domestic in nature could therefore pass one of the threshold requirements for
invoking the SICC’s jurisdiction,135 but will not fall within the scope of the
CCAA. Thus, “[n]ot every Convention case will be an SICC case, and not
every SICC case will be a Convention case”.136
2. Jurisdiction for cases falling within the scope of the Choice of Court
Agreements Act 2016
If there is an exclusive choice of court agreement for the Singapore court and the
matter falls within the scope of the CCAA, the Singapore court can only refuse to
hear the dispute if the agreement is null and void under the law of Singapore.137 In
addition, the Singapore court cannot decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground
that the dispute should be decided in a court of another State. This precludes the
court from considering the issue of forum non conveniens.138 The restrictive bases
Yeo, “Scope and Limits of Party Autonomy under the Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements” (2018) 11th Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture, [16]–
[26] (https://cebcla.smu.edu.sg/sites/cebcla.smu.edu.sg/ﬁles/Paper2018.pdf accessed on
18 September 2018).
131CCAA, s 8.
132However, there is a provision permitting the parties to the claim to expressly agree that
the subject matter of the claim is commercial in nature: Rules of Court, O 110, r 2(b)(iii).
133CCAA, s 4(1). The CCAA adopts a different deﬁnition of “international” for recognition
and enforcement purposes: CCAA, s 4(2).
134Rules of Court, O 110, r 2(a)(iv).
135However, the lack of material foreign connecting factors may be a relevant consideration
when the SICC is considering whether to decline to assume jurisdiction under Rules of
Court, O 110 r 8.
136Yeo, supra note 54, [53].
137CCAA, s 11(1). The reference to “Singapore law” here is to be understood to include
Singapore’s choice of law rules: Hartley and Dogauchi Report, supra note 125, [125].
138Hartley and Dogauchi Report, supra note 125, [132], [134]. While the CCAA reserves
the possibility of regulations being enacted to enable the Singapore court to decline to exer-
cise jurisdiction in any other circumstances (CCAA, s 11(3)), to date, no regulations have
been enacted.
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on which jurisdiction may be refused and curtailment of the element of discretion
under the CCAA may suggest that distinct procedural rules for assuming jurisdic-
tion apply for claims under the CCAA. However, this is not the case. Instead, jur-
isdiction for cases falling under the CCAA will have to be asserted by using the
existing jurisdictional frameworks,139 although, as will be seen below, the ﬁt is
not seamless.
Relevantly for the SICC, a chosen court in Singapore is permitted to transfer
the case to another Singapore court if the discretion to do so exists under Singa-
pore law.140 The chosen court must, however, before deciding on the issue of
transfer, take into account the parties’ choice of court.141 While transfers are
allowed, they may have repercussions at the recognition and enforcement stage.
This point will be explored further below.
The general rules under which the SICC has jurisdiction have already been
explained above.142 If the case falls within the scope of the CCAA and the
SICC is the chosen court, then in line with the ﬁrst core principle of the
HCCCA, it has an obligation to hear the case. The point made earlier in Part III
above, that service under the SICC regime serves a notiﬁcation rather than juris-
dictional function applies a fortiori when the SICC is hearing a case which is
subject to the CCAA. The parties cannot, after all, contract out of the CCAA.
If the case falls within the scope of the CCAA but the Singapore High Court is
the chosen court,143 again, service on the defendant serves a notiﬁcation function
Despite the obligation on the court to hear the case, service on a defendant who is
not in Singapore and where the choice of court agreement does not contain a
mechanism by which service may be effected in Singapore,144 is ostensibly still
subject to discretion.145 This is because the CCAA makes no provisions for
service and leave to serve on the defendant abroad will have to be sought pursuant
to the three steps set out above in Part III(A) which apply to non-SICC cases. The
three steps articulate what is required to fulﬁl the procedural rules for an appli-
cation for leave to serve out that are set out in Order 11 rule 2. In relation to the
ﬁrst step, there appear to be a couple of heads of Order 11 which the plaintiff
could rely on in this instance. One is rule 1(r): “the claim is in respect of
matters in which the defendant has submitted or agreed to submit to the jurisdic-
tion of the Court”. The other is rule 1(s): “the claim concerns the construction,
139Order 110 of the Rules of Court, which deals speciﬁcally with the SICC, was amended to
take into account the coming into force of the CCAA. However, the amendments do not
paper over every irregularity between the two regimes.
140CCAA, s 11(5).
141Ibid, s 11(5).
142Part C.2.
143The parties would have to expressly make clear that their choice of the Singapore High
Court excludes the SICC; see below, Section D.3(b).
144Rules of Court, O 10, r 3.
145Cf UK Civil Procedure Rules, r 6.33(2).
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effect or enforcement of any written law”, that written law being the CCAA in this
case and the speciﬁc qualiﬁer being the enforcement of the CCAA. As the CCAA
sets out the Singapore court’s obligations to assume jurisdiction in instances where
it is the exclusively chosen court and to recognise and enforce a judgment from
another exclusively chosen Contracting State court, Order 11 rule 1(s) would be
appropriate if the Singapore court is called upon to assume either obligation.
Insofar as the third step is concerned, as noted above, the Singapore court is
precluded from considering forum non conveniens.146 The third step is the
common law elucidation of Rule 2(2) of Order 11 which provides that: “No
such leave shall be granted unless it shall be made sufﬁciently to appear to the
Court that the case is a proper one for service out of Singapore under this
Order.”147 The question of whether “the case is a proper one for service out”
would of course be context speciﬁc. If the case at hand does not involve a
choice of court agreement, part of the question of whether “the case is a proper
one for service out” would depend on the plaintiff being able to show that Singa-
pore is forum conveniens. If there is an exclusive choice of court agreement in
favour of the court of a non-Contracting State, the plaintiff will have to show
strong cause why he should be allowed to breach the contract. However, if the
case at hand falls within the scope of the CCAA and involves a choice of court
agreement in favour of Singapore, the case would always be a “proper one for
service out” simpliciter.148 The result in the last scenario coheres with non-
CCAA cases, where Singapore courts readily grant leave to serve the writ out
where there is a choice of court agreement for Singapore in place. That said, it
should not be overlooked that the court’s jurisdiction is mandatory in a CCAA
case and discretionary for a non-CCAA case; it would have been more appropriate
for a rule that is equivalent to Order 110 rule 6(2) of the Rules of Court to be for-
mulated for the former scenario.
For completeness, it should be noted that if the CCAA is engaged but the
exclusive choice of court agreement is in favour of another Contracting State
court, the case would not be a “proper one for service out” unless one of the excep-
tions set out in section 12 of the CCAA applies.
3. The recognition and enforcement of SICC judgments under the HCCCA
As explained above,149 there are two ways in which the SICC may come to hear a
case. First, where the parties have chosen the SICC as the forum for dispute res-
olution. Secondly, where the case has been transferred to the SICC from the
146Hartley and Dogauchi Report, supra note 125, [132], [134].
147PT Gunung Madu Plantations v Muhammad Jimmy Goh Mashun [2018] SGHC 64, [30]
and [60].
148Assuming that it has been established that there is a serious issue to be tried on the merits.
149Part C.2.
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Singapore High Court. While reference may be made to choice of court agree-
ments which fall outside the scope of the CCAA for comparison, the focus in
this section is on choice of court agreements which are concluded on or after
the 1 October 2016, which is the date on which the CCAA entered into force.
(a) Where the parties have chosen the “SICC” as the forum for dispute
resolution
If the parties have inserted into their contract a choice of court agreement in favour
of the SICC, the analysis is relatively straightforward. Even without an express
designation of exclusivity, section 18F of the SCJA provides that the parties are
presumed to have agreed to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the SICC
unless there is an express provision to the contrary in the agreement. A debate
as to whether section 18F will apply if the proper law of the contract is not Singa-
pore law150 is moot when the case falls under the scope of the CCAA as the
concept of “deemed” exclusivity prevails under the Convention.151 Thus, the
SICC is the “chosen court” and as such, its judgment, subject to recognised
defences being made out, must be recognised and enforced by other Contracting
State courts.
(b) Where the parties have chosen the “Singapore High Court” as the forum for
dispute resolution
According to the Rules of Court, an agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the
“High Court” which is concluded before 1 October 2016152 does not of itself con-
stitute an agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the SICC.153 These agreements
fall outside the scope of the CCAA. In contrast, if the agreement to submit to the
jurisdiction of the “High Court” is concluded on or after 1 October 2016, rule 1
(2)(ca) of Order 110, Rules of Court provides that: “the agreement is to be con-
strued as including an agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the [SICC],
unless a contrary intention appears in the agreement.”154 In connection with
this, the Hartley and Dogauchi Report explains that:
[t]he choice of court agreement may refer either to the courts of a Contracting State in
general, or to one or more speciﬁc courts in one Contracting State. Thus an agree-
ment designating ‘the courts of France’ is regarded as exclusive for the purposes
150See further Yeo, supra note 54, [22].
151HCCCA, Article 3(b).
152This is the date on which the Choice of Court Agreements Act 2016 (No 14 of 2016),
which enacts the HCCCA into Singapore law, entered into force.
153Rules of Court, O 110, r 1(2)(c).
154Ibid, r 1(2)(ca). See also, CCAA, s 2(2).
124 A. Chong and M. Yip
of the Convention, even though it does not specify which court in France will hear
the proceedings… In such a case, French law will be entitled to decide in which
court or courts the action may be brought. Subject to any such rule, the plaintiff
may choose any court in France.155
Thus, even if the choice of court agreement for the Singapore court does not
specify the SICC, the SICC is the “chosen court” and can hear the claim if the
subject-matter falls within its purview. Subject to any recognised defences being
established, the resulting SICC judgment must be recognised and enforced in
other Contracting State courts.
However, it may be the case that the parties did not intend to submit to the jur-
isdiction of the SICC, but lacking proper legal advice, did not appreciate that the
form of words used did not exclude the jurisdiction of the SICC. There is no “con-
trary intention… in the agreement”.156 The wording of rule 1(2)(ca) appears to
foreclose the possibility of the parties putting forward any other evidence to illus-
trate their intentions on the scope of the choice of court agreement. This is contrary
to ordinary rules of contractual interpretation under Singapore law,157 whereby
extrinsic evidence may be admitted to interpret the terms of the contract.158
There appears to be a conﬂation between, one the one hand, rules of evidence
involving evidentiary presumptions and the admissibility of extrinsic evidence,
and, on the other hand, substantive prescriptions on the nature of a choice of
court agreement. However, rule 1(2)(ca) is based on Article 3(b) of the
HCCCA159 which provides that a choice of court agreement is “deemed to be
exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise”. The HCCCA
skirts the issue of conﬂation by its careful choice of word. Brand and Herrup
explain that: “The use of the term ‘deemed’ rather than ‘presumed’ was deliberate.
The framers wished to avoid entanglements in local evidence law, including the
nature of evidentiary presumptions.”160
Nevertheless, the “deemed” exclusivity that operates under Article 3(b) of the
HCCCA operates in a more palatable manner compared to Order 110, rule 1(2)(ca)
of the Rules of Court. When Article 3(b) applies, there is consent to that particular
court’s jurisdiction after all, although that consent may be mischaracterised as
consent to exclusive jurisdiction rather than to non-exclusive jurisdiction in
155Hartley and Dogauchi Report, supra n 125, [103] (footnote reference omitted).
156Rules of Court, O 110, r 1(2)(ca).
157Cf Choice of court agreements for the “Singapore High Court” which are concluded
before 1 October 2016, where extrinsic evidence can be used to show that the parties did
not intend to submit to the SICC.
158See further Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construc-
tion Pte Ltd [2008] SGCA 27, [2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029; Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Hold-
ings Pte Ltd [2013] SGCA 43, [2013] 4 SLR 193.
159Yeo, supra note 54, [36].
160R Brand and P Herrup, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
(CUP, 2008), 42–43.
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some cases. In the scenario posited above, the parties do not in reality agree to the
SICC’s jurisdiction, but are deemed to have done so by operation of rule 1(2)(ca).
In contrast with the other instances ﬂeshed out above, party autonomy is under-
mined within the SICC regime.161 That said, the forfeit of autonomy could be jus-
tiﬁed as being for the greater good: when the resulting judgment comes before the
court of another Contracting State, it would be entitled to recognition and enforce-
ment under the HCCCA’s rules. A further practical consequence relates to drafting
practice: parties will need to be more considered in their drafting of jurisdiction
agreements, instead of treating them as midnight clauses.
(c) When the case is transferred from the Singapore High Court to the SICC
As alluded to above, one can expect most of the cases which the SICC hears in its
nascent years to be transfer cases, ie cases which originate in the Singapore High
Court but which are transferred to the SICC pursuant to Order 110, rule 12.162 The
enforceability of judgments in transfer scenarios is therefore an important issue.
Where the parties have chosen the “Singapore High Court” and the case is com-
menced in the High Court, a transfer to the SICC does not raise particular issues as
that choice will be taken to include the SICC for agreements concluded on or after
1 October 2016.163 If there is no express provision otherwise, the agreement is
deemed to be exclusive in nature164 and would fall within the scope of the CCAA.
Other non-chosen Contracting State courts must refuse to hear the case and the
SICC judgment must be recognised and enforced in other Contracting State courts.
However, where the parties have expressly indicated that their choice of the
“Singapore High Court” excludes the SICC, one must tread more carefully. If
the choice of court agreement predates the coming into force of the CCAA, the
High Court can order the transfer on its own motion.165 However, if the choice
of court agreement falls within the scope of the CCAA, the Rules of Court as
amended to take into account the coming into force of the CCAA stipulate that
the case may be transferred from the High Court to the SICC only if the parties
consent to the transfer.166 This goes over and above the threshold set by the
CCAA, which does not mandate party consent for transfers but qualiﬁes the
161Yeo has pointed out that the deeming provision under Article 3(b) is sensible from the
perspective of procedural efﬁciency but the deeming provisions under the SICC rules
operate to “broaden the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts”. Yeo TM, supra note 130, [15].
162See above, note 28.
163Rules of Court, O 110, r 1(2)(ca). See also CCAA, s 2(2). The plaintiff may, if it wishes,
commence proceedings directly in the SICC.
164HCCCA, Art 3(b); CCAA, s 3(2).
165Rules of Court, O 110, r 12(4)(b)(ii). The issue of the recognition and enforcement of the
resulting SICC judgment falls outside the scope of the HCCCA.
166Ibid, r 12(3B).
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freedom to transfer by cautioning that: “the chosen court must, before exercising
that discretion, take into account the parties’ choice of court.”167
There appear to be at least two related reasons why party consent is required.
First, judgments from a transfer case still fall within the recognition and enforce-
ment regime of the HCCCA, notwithstanding that the judgment may not be from
the “chosen court”.168 However, Article 8(5) of the HCCCA provides that:
where the chosen court had discretion as to whether to transfer the case to another
court, recognition or enforcement of the judgment may be refused against a party
who objected to the transfer in a timely manner in the State of origin.
Making party consent a pre-requisite for any transfer from the High Court to the
SICC ensures that the SICC judgment will be recognised and enforced in other
Contracting States. Secondly, if the parties wish to choose the Singapore High
Court sans SICC, they would have to positively indicate that they do not wish
to include the SICC in their choice of court agreement since the SICC is a division
of the Singapore High Court. This makes it far harder for a transfer to be justiﬁed if
it is done without the parties’ consent, all the more so given the rather different
framework within which the SICC operates, and far harder for a court in
another Contracting State to justify enforcing the SICC judgment.169 Thus, man-
dating party consent for transfer cases enhances the conﬁdence of litigants in the
portability of SICC judgments and the attractiveness of the SICC as a forum for
dispute resolution in general.
Another notable provision is Order 110, rule 13A(2) of the Rules of Court.
This provides:
In any case mentioned in Rule 12(3B) where an exclusive choice of court agreement
designates the High Court, but not the [SICC], as a chosen court for the case, the
High Court may, before transferring the case to the [SICC], direct every party to
the exclusive choice of court agreement to vary that agreement, so as to designate
the [SICC] as a chosen court for the case.170
The variation can only be ordered where, in accordance with Order 110, Rule 12
(3B), there has been party consent to the transfer. This means that even without
such a variation, the SICC judgment would still beneﬁt from mandatory recog-
nition and enforcement in other Contracting States. However, with a varied
167CCAA, s 11(5).
168Courts of other Contracting States may hear the case given that the SICC would not be
the “chosen court”: Art 6(e).
169The case can be transferred from the High Court to the SICC without parties’ consent for
non-HCCCA cases. See Rules of Court, O 110, r 12(4)(b)(ii).
170A corresponding provision gives the SICC the power to direct the parties to vary a SICC
choice of court agreement in favour of the High Court before the transfer of the case from
the SICC to the High Court. See Rules of Court, O 110, r 13A(1).
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clause in favour of the SICC, the recognition and enforcement of its judgment in
other Contracting States will be a more straightforward affair as it will be treated as
a non-transfer judgment. Rule 13A(2) therefore serves to further bolster the enfor-
ceability of SICC judgments abroad.
V. Conclusion
Respect of party autonomy is now the norm in international commercial dispute
resolution. Negotiators at the Hague Conference realised that, rather than continu-
ing intractable negotations on a broad-based Convention, focusing on party auton-
omy provided the surest route to harmonisation. The resulting Convention and the
CCAA by and large pays heed to this principle. In contrast, the embrace of party
autonomy in the SICC framework serves a different purpose; it is to accentuate
Singapore’s competitive advantage as a dispute resolution hub. As this article
has highlighted, the SICC regime upholds party autonomy to an unprecedented
degree in a number of respects. Parties have the liberty to deﬁne their claims so
that it would be construed to fall within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
SICC. A choice of court agreement in the SICC’s favour is treated as dispensing
with the usual jurisdiction-founding function of service of process. The traditional
common law tests dealing with the exercise of jurisdiction are also disregarded or
tweaked within the SICC’s jurisdictional framework. The CCAA and correspond-
ing procedural rules have been drafted to make certain that SICC judgments will
enjoy portability under the HCCCA.
Many of these developments build on existing pro-autonomy rules. The dis-
pensation of the court’s leave for service out of jurisdiction where there is a
written jurisdiction agreement in the SICC’s favour arguably takes but a small
step outside of existing Singapore rules. The irrelevance of Spiliada principles
in cases involving written SICC jurisdiction agreements reinforces the already
strong common law attitude towards the enforcement of jurisdiction agreements.
The broadening of the range of factors that can be considered under the Spiliada
test where there is a possibility of transfer of proceedings from the High Court to
the SICC is also consistent with the underlying philosophy and modern appli-
cation of the test.
The case study of Singapore further offers reﬂections on a more general level.
Viewed against the global trend of setting up specialist courts and the increased
interest in harmonisation of rules, the Singapore experience offers food for
thought on how far the recalibration of balance between forum-state regulatory
authority and party autonomy should be pushed. In particular, two issues may
bear further thought. First, is leave of court truly necessary for service of legal
process abroad where the parties have agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of
the forum court? Secondly, how the Spiliada test relates to non-exclusive juris-
diction agreements warrants fuller consideration. Given the variety of non-exclu-
sive jurisdiction agreements in practice, a “one size ﬁts all” test may not be
appropriate.
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Postcript
As of 1 November 2018, pursuant to section 18D(2) of the SCJA, the SICC’s jur-
isdiction has been expanded to include jurisdiction to hear any proceedings relat-
ing to international commercial arbitration that the Singapore High Court may hear
under the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, Rev Ed 2002). These appli-
cations include stay of proceedings, interim measures, challenges to arbitrators,
challenges to awards, recognition and enforcement of awards, appeals on ruling
of jurisdiction and subpoenas. This recent amendment of the SICC rules does
not affect the analysis put forward in this article.
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